

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

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Appendix II. IRBM THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C. SECTIONS 793 and 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

The Soviet IRBM poses the same grave threat to Western Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle East and Far East that the ICBM poses to the United States. The threat becomes even more serious in light of the obvious successes achieved by the Soviets during the R&D phase of the program. Operational firings have been conducted to ranges of 950 and 1050 nautical miles at KAPUSTIN YAR since June 1957. An IRBM with a nominal range of 1100 nautical miles is considered to be in operational units now.

From bases contiguous to the borders of the U.S.S.R., well over 90% of the critical targets in the areas indicated above are within range of an 1100 NM missile. The time of flight for the maximum range is some 13 or 14 minutes. This brief flight time precludes adequate warning for effective reaction prior to impact. Countermeasures must be implemented in time to prevent destruction of governmental control and the industrial base and military units capable of reacting to the Soviet armed force which probably would follow the initial nuclear attack. Effective implementation of countermeasures will be possible only if the Soviet operational missile sites have been accurately located and their operational and physical characteristics defined.

At the present time we have no direct evidence of the location of IRBM launching sites. Fragmentary information gleaned from the coverage of KAPUSTIN YAR in September 1957 indicates the probability of a rail-served or rail-launched IRBM system. Since so many targets can be covered from within the Soviet Union, there is no reason to assume that the Soviets will complicate their logistic support problem by moving outside of their borders. The highly-developed rail system and general dearth of all-weather roads adds weight to the argument for a rail-served system.

Our intelligence on the IRBM program is more complete than the ICBM program, yet we have little or no information on missile configuration, warhead size and weight, propellant utilized, military organization, and philosophy of deployment of the IRBM.

It is believed that the CHALICE program is the only currently feasible and readily available means which offers reasonable assurance of obtaining the required intelligence to facilitate an assessment of the scope of the IRBM program and providing sufficient data to assist in the implementation of countermeasures should the Soviets choose to attack.

The establishment of priorities for coverage of IRBM targets is difficult at best. The need for coverage of operational sites is a pressing one since it must be assumed that development of these sites is in an advanced stage at this time. However, no good leads are available indicating the location of these sites and present assumptions may prove entirely fallacious. Though production facilities are important, it is not anticipated that coverage of production centers by aerial photography will add materially to the missile picture since most Soviet plants

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produce more than one item and there is no way of determining the amount of space allotted to missile production. Some benefit would accrue if missiles were discovered in open storage. KAPUSTIN YAR was covered in September 1957, but many facilities were covered on obliques and many facilities were missed. Each of the more important launching facilities showed evidence of major construction activity which indicated expansion of the then current testing program or conversion to a new program. Since the overflight took place, reports of firings in the down range areas have been received. Of particular interest are the firings from an area just north of CHELKAR and another in the vicinity of the 650 NM impact area. It is felt that recoverage of KY will add materially to our knowledge of the Soviet IRBM program, not only by obtaining information on the missile characteristics, but also through identification of special handling equipment and crew training facilities. We also believe that we can discern leads which will materially assist in the identification of operational sites by comparing KY today with its facilities as known in September 1957.

In light of the discussion above, it is recommended that the following priorities be instituted for the IRBM program.

I. KAPUSTIN YAR, to include the rangehead, STALINGRAD and the other areas indicated on the attached map.

II. The area contiguous to the Western U.S.S.R. border, particularly the ODESSA-LENINGRAD rail lines as outlined in CIA/RR-6R-165 (SECRET), 22 November 1957.

III. The area in the Far East extending from KRASKINO-SLAVYANKA through VLADIVOSTOK to Khabarovsk along the rail line.

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